Introduction
In his 1962 study, The Man on Horseback, S.E. Finer identifies five necessary "conditions of military intervention in politics:" professionalization of the officer corps, the rise of nationalism and the nation-state, popular sovereignty, the emergence of an "insurrectionary army" and the creation of "new, independent states."1 Finer suggests that these conditions contributed to many of the military revolts and attempted coups in the 1960s, such as those in Lebanon, Turkey, Venezuela, Portugal and Ethiopia.2 While this may hold true for the geopolitical context of the 1960s, it remains to be seen if Finer's framework has widespread applicability. The paper, therefore, proposes the following research question: does Finer's framework hold for the case of the 1999 military coup in Pakistan?
It will be argued that while not all of Finer's conditions are necessarily fully applicable to Pakistan, his overall framework nonetheless accounts for the major drivers of the 1999 coup.
The paper will define key terms, provide background on the 1999 coup, and outline the research design and present data for each of the five conditions to assess the findings. The paper will conclude with a discussion on future avenues of research.
Definitions
Finer refers to "military intervention in politics" as a scaled measurement with four distinct levels of severity. and expertise, in particular, perpetuate this belief because armed forces begin to view themselves as better judges of military and security matters than the civilian authority.
6
The rise of nationalism and the nation-state: Finer contends that this condition could trigger intervention because it reinforces the military's perception that it is the guardian of the nation's values. 7 In this context, the government must demonstrate that it is "synonymous with and representative of the nation" to avoid intervention and gain the military's loyalty.
8
The substitution from the divine authority of kings to the dogma of popular sovereignty: Popular sovereignty is the idea that "the people are the sole source of all legitimate power." 9 Finer argues that popular sovereignty provides a rationale for any group, including the military, to seize power by claiming to represent the will of the people.
10
Insurrectionary armies: Such armies are particularly prone to intervene in politics because, by definition, they seek to liberate the territory and overthrow social order.
11
The emergence of new, independent states: Finer notes that the quest for independence often breeds nationalism and exacerbates existing economic, ethnic and religious cleavages.
12 He contends that these conditions represent "a sure invitation to military intervention" because the professional military is not only a symbol of nationhood, but it is often able to fulfill the "need for a strong central government."
13

Background
Pakistan has a long tradition of military intervention in politics, including three military coups since its creation in 1947. 14 The 1999 coup was especially important not only in so far as The paper will employ data from both primary and secondary sources to explore the above measures. Sources include official government publications, speeches, and memoirs from military personnel, including Musharraf, as well as case studies by both Pakistani and Western scholars.
42. The table is organized according to Finer's own classification of measures as they relate to each of the five conditions. The paper assumes that Finer's observations regarding the 1960s coups and the logic behind the five conditions are sound. For example, the paper accepts his logic that professionalism impels the military to intervene in politics. Moreover, it assumes that professionalism does, in fact, carry universal meaning and can be applied to non-Western armies such as the Pakistani Armed Forces. The paper also assumes that it is reasonable to quantify Finer's narrative style into specific measures as presented in the above table.
As with all research, this paper has certain limitations. It does not use statistical analysis to assess the degree of correlation between the five conditions and military intervention, nor does it assess the extent to which each of the conditions individually contributed to the coup. Instead, it aims to demonstrate that the framework, as a whole, holds for the coup. Further, the paper only covers the case of the 1999 coup in Pakistan. Therefore, the findings will be relevant only for this case and cannot be generalized to all contemporary military interventions.
Lastly, the paper relies heavily on secondary sources which may produce different results regarding professionalism and the role of the military than reliance on government publications or official military documents. The decision to consult secondary sources is largely based on the fact that most military documents in Pakistan are unavailable to the public.
Despite these limitations, this paper contributes to the existing body of research on civil-military relations in two distinct ways. First, it tests the validity of Finer's framework. This is important because while past scholars have offered critiques of Finer's study and have even considered its applicability to more recent cases, none have tested it in this specific context.
43
The second contribution is that the paper attempts to understand the 1999 coup through a theoretical lens. As noted by Zulfiqar Ali, many scholars have "explored the causes attributed to the failure of democracy in Pakistan," however few have "employed a theoretical framework to understand the empirical reality."
44
Results and Data Analysis for Condition 1
Professionalization of the officer corps
The first "condition of military intervention in politics" is the professionalization of the officer corps.
45 This section will present data regarding the expertise, social responsibility and corporate unity of the Pakistan Armed Forces to determine whether they constitute a "professional" military. It will then assess whether professionalism contributed to the military's decision to launch the 1999 coup by considering whether there was a gap between the role of the army and politicians. The section will also assess whether there was a perception that civilian control over foreign affairs and domestic matters frustrated or impinged on the military task.
Are the Pakistan Armed Forces a "professional army?" General Musharraf, declared that the "Pakistan Army has accepted the challenge to assist the nation in these trying and uncertain conditions." 61 He further added that "the spirit of loyalty is instilled deeply in all ranks of the army…At the senior command level, there is a larger sense of loyalty to a common cause or toward the protection of the nation."
62
Similarly, in his 1994 army training document, Col. Saifi Ahmad Naqvi noted that the army is responsible for the "defence of the country," including "safeguarding the integrity, territorial boundaries, and the ideological frontiers to which the country owes its existence." In addition to ethnic homogeneity, the perceived threat from India acts as a "unifying force" for the military and "gives it its professional essence." 74 Musharraf's insistence on continuing to fight against India during the Kargil War is an excellent example because it received broad support from the military and further distinguished the army's goals and interests from those of the civilian authorities.
75
These examples illustrate that the Pakistan Army does in fact, meet Finer's condition of a professional army. It possesses expertise in the use of force, instils social responsibility in its leadership, and has a strong corporate identity stemming from its ethnic make-up and adversarial relationship with India.
1.2
Did professionalism contribute to the military's decision to launch the 1999 coup?
Gap between role and responsibility of the army and politicians
According to Finer, professionalism impels the army into politics because it creates a gap between the armed forces and politicians whereby politicians are charged with policymaking while the armed forces control the use of force. 76 The argument is that having a gap creates the possibility for mistrust and animosity which could lead one to intervene into the others' domain. This is in contrast to the "old regimes" where the aristocracy had full control of both policy-making and the use of force, which left little room for intervention. "The Kargil episode created the biggest divide between the prime minister and myself.
We had both wanted to put Kashmir firmly on the world's radar screen, politically as well as militarily. The Kargil initiative succeeded in doing so. Yet when external political pressure forced Nawaz Sharif to vacate the liberated area, he broke down…It was in dealing with Kargil that the prime minister exposed his mediocrity and set himself on a collision course with the army and me."
80
These examples not only demonstrate that the Pakistani army does, in fact, fit the definition of a professional army, but they also show that professionalism contributed to the army's decision to launch the 1999 coup by creating a gap between the army and politicians and by fuelling the perception that the Sharif government was disrupting the military's task. It can therefore be concluded that the first of Finer's conditions, the professionalization of the officer corps, holds for the Pakistani case. Finer argues that military is more likely to intervene in politics if its loyalty is directed towards the nation-state, rather than the civil government. 97 That is to say, the military may perceive a "duty to be disloyal to the government" in order to preserve the integrity of the nation.
Results and Data Analysis for Condition 2
98
This condition is applicable to the 1999 military coup in Pakistan because Musharraf repeatedly expressed his allegiance to the state as more important than his duty towards the government. For example, he explained his decision to undermine the Constitution by stating "The choice was between saving the body-that is the nation, at the cost of losing a limb-which is the Constitution, or saving the limb and losing the whole body. The Constitution is but a part of the nation, therefore I chose to save the nation."
99
Aqil Shah notes that the "army's messianic mission to resuscitate the nation" was engrained into the top level of army officials. 100 Major General Asif Duraiz Akhtar, for instance, writes:
A focal point of the Army's role in nation-building must be that of a surgeon, who has to make hard decisions on behalf of the patient for saving his life, including amputation if required.
Those decisions will bother some who have vested interests…but the condition of the patient warrants such bold actions.
101
It can be concluded that the rise of nationalism laid the foundation for military intervention because the military increasingly regarded itself as the "custodian of the nation's values," thereby prioritizing the perceived interest of the nation above the authority of the elected government. Insurrectionary armies are prone to intervention because they exist to "liberate the national territory or the overthrow of the social order." 109 Finer notes that the leaders of such armies tend to become political rulers in an ensuing new social order, which then sets a precedent for military involvement in politics. Indian army had to be unscrambled and reorganised into fresh units."
111
Because of the inapplicability of this one particular measure, one may be led to question community, feared that they would be unable to exercise power as a minority within a united India.
120
As Cohen notes, the Partition resulted in a clear "underdog mentality" among the This backdrop yet again points the relevance of Finer's framework: poor economic conditions and ethnic conflicts result in "passionate nationalism," which in turns creates the pre-conditions for the military to propel itself into the political sphere. the bureaucracy, and later to the military as it became increasingly involved in politics.
136
Hasan Askari Rizvi adds that the need for a strong, central government, rather than "participatory political institutions" created an environment favourable to military intervention as the military was not only seen as a symbol of nationhood but it also possessed a certain coercive power necessary to create a strong government.
137
Therefore, it can be concluded that the measure generally holds for Pakistan. This being said it is difficult to measure the extent to which it contributed to the 1999 coup. It could be argued, for instance, that Musharraf was not interested in pursuing a "strong, central government," because his "seven-point plan" for Pakistan included "devolving power to the grassroots." 138 In this regard, it is fair to state that the inability to draw clear causal linkages through statistical analysis is a limitation of this paper.
The following Gap between role and responsibility of the army and politicians
Perception that politicians' control over foreign affairs and domestic matters frustrates and impinges on the military task 
